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Abstract—Deep neural network (DNN) models have proven
to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we
propose VisionGuard, a novel attack- and dataset-agnostic and
computationally-light defense mechanism for adversarial inputs
to DNN-based perception systems. In particular, VisionGuard
relies on the observation that adversarial images are sensitive to
lossy compression transformations. Specifically, to determine if
an image is adversarial, VisionGuard checks if the output of the
target classifier on a given input image changes significantly after
feeding it a transformed version of the image under investigation.
Moreover, we show that VisionGuard is computationally-light
both at runtime and design-time which makes it suitable for
real-time applications that may also involve large-scale image
domains. To highlight this, we demonstrate the efficiency of
VisionGuard on ImageNet, a task that is computationally chal-
lenging for the majority of relevant defenses. Finally, we include
extensive comparative experiments on the MNIST, CIFAR10, and
ImageNet datasets that show that VisionGuard outperforms ex-
isting defenses in terms of scalability and detection performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been deployed in
multiple safety-critical systems, such as medical imaging,
autonomous cars, and surveillance systems. At the same time,
DNNs have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples [1], i.e., inputs which have deliberately been modified to
cause either misclassification or desired incorrect prediction
that would benefit an attacker. Adversarial examples in the
literature can be divided into two sub-classes depending on
how the attack is executed. One augments the physical en-
vironment to induce misclassification (e.g., adding a sticker
to a stop sign) [2], while the other adds a small perturbation
to the classifier input data. In this work, when we refer to
adversarial examples, we only refer to the latter subclass (i.e.,
small perturbation attacks). Adversarial examples (especially
in the case of image classification) have received increased
research attention due to the following properties. First, the
difference between legitimate and adversarial inputs can be
imperceptible, making adversarial detection a very challenging
task [1]. Second, the transferability of adversarial samples
between different models allows for black-box attacks [3], [4].
Third, adversarial samples are often misclassified with high
confidence, implying that DNNs fail to discriminate between
adversarial and legitimate inputs [5].
To establish reliability and security of DNN-based percep-
tion systems against adversarial input images, we propose,
VisionGuard, a novel attack- and dataset-agnostic detection
framework. VisionGuard does not modify the specific classifier
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and, does not rely on building separate classifiers. Instead,
VisionGuard relies on the observation that adversaries may be
successful at fooling DNNs due to the large feature space over
which they can look for adversarial inputs. This is also vali-
dated in our experiments: the larger the input space (i.e., image
dimensions), the easier to fool the target classifier. Motivated
by this, the proposed defense aims to shrink the feature space
available to adversaries. In particular, to determine if an image
is adversarial, VisionGuard checks if the softmax output of the
target classifier on a given input image changes significantly
after feeding it a ‘refined’ version of that image. To refine
images, i.e., to squeeze out possibly unnecessary features
of the input image, we apply lossy compression algorithms
(e.g., JPEG) with high compression quality. Then, we measure
the similarity of the corresponding softmax outputs using
the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence metric. If this metric
is above a threshold, the image is classified as adversarial;
otherwise, it is classified as clean.
A. Related Works
Similar defenses that rely on image transformations have
also been proposed in the image purification domain. For
instance, [6], [7] apply JPEG compression, bit depth reduction,
and crop ensemble to remove noise and possible adversarial
components from images. However, purification is applied
to all images, whether they are adversarial or not, which
compromises the accuracy of the network on clean images
[8]. In contrast, VisionGuard does not affect the accuracy
of the target classifier. Image transformations have also been
employed in [9] to detect adversarial inputs but in a completely
different way than the proposed one. In particular, [9] relies
on building a DNN-based detector that takes as input K ×N
features, where K is the number of applied transformations
(e.g., rotation and translation) and N is the number of log-
its/classes. For instance, for the MNIST dataset K = 45 and
N = 10 while for ImageNet there are N = 1000 logits.
Similar to VisionGuard, MagNet [10] checks if an input image
is adversarial by applying a single image transformation and
examining the corresponding softmax output. The difference
is that instead of compression algorithms, MagNet employs
auto-encoders to generate new images that are reconstructed
from the original ones. Related defenses that complement
VisionGuard such as robust/adversarial training [1], [11] and
image purification approaches [12] are discussed in Section
III.
B. Evaluation: Scalability & Detection Performance
We evaluate VisionGuard on the MNIST, CIFAR10, and
ImageNet datasets and we show that, unlike relevant works, it
is very computationally light in terms of runtime and memory
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requirements, even when it is applied to large-scale datasets,
such as ImageNet; therefore, it can be employed in real-time
applications that may also involve large-scale image spaces.
We provide extensive comparisons that show that VisionGuard
outperforms similar detectors [10], [13], [14] both in terms of
scalability and detection performance.
a) Scalability: In particular, VisionGuard attains compa-
rable performance to these defenses on small datasets, such as
MNIST and CIFAR10, but is more computationally efficient
in terms of memory requirements. Due to its low compu-
tational cost at both runtime and design-time, VisionGuard
is suitable for real-time applications that may involve large-
scale image domains. as highlighted by our experiment on
ImageNet images. To the contrary, application of [10], [13],
[14] to ImageNet is computationally challenging. Specifically,
the defense in [10] requires the training of additional auto-
encoders. In fact, we were unable to train an auto-encoder
for ImageNet within two weeks of training. The detector in
[13], [14], on the other hand, requires extracting and storing
the last hidden layer output for all training images which is
a time-consuming process and may not be possible on all
platforms (e.g., lightweight IoT cameras) due to excessive
memory requirements. These embeddings are used at runtime
to check if an image is adversarial. The same limitation also
holds for [15] which employs the KDE detector [13], [14]
but additionally requires a specific training process for the
target classifier. Similarly, [9] requires training a new DNN
detector. Additionally, [9] is significantly more computation-
ally expensive than VisionGuard, since at runtime it requires
the application of K image transformations and the last hidden
layer output of the target classifier for each transformed image.
b) Detection Performance: Also, we provide extensive
experiments that show that VisionGuard attains high detection
performance on the MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet datasets.
The detectors in [13], [14], [10] attain similar performance
to VisionGuard on MNIST and CIFAR 10 but their per-
formance drops significantly in more complex datasets such
as ImageNet. In fact their performance is comparable to a
random detector. Moreover, we would like to emphasize that
the defenses proposed in [10], [9], [13], [14], [15] are dataset-
specific as they heavily rely on training sets directly and/or
building separate DNN models based on these training sets.
Particularly, in these works, a new auto-encoder and a new
DNN-based detector need to be built and new embeddings
need to be extracted and stored for each dataset. Therefore, it
is unclear how these methods perform when they are deployed
in real-world environments for which datasets do not exist. To
the contrary, VisionGuard does not rely on training sets, or on
the training process of the target DNN, or on building separate
DNN classifiers. For instance, we show through extensive
experiments that VisionGuard is dataset-agnostic in the sense
that the same transformation (JPEG with compression quality
92%) yields high detection performance across datasets that
differ both in content and in image dimensions.
Finally, we would like to highlight that several white-box
attacks have been proposed to bypass existing defenses under
the assumption that the structure of the defense mechanism
is known to the attacker [16], [17], [18], [19]. Designing
Fig. 1. Examples of almost imperceptible adversarial images from ImageNet
after CW attack.
defenses against white-box attacks is out of the scope of this
paper. Instead, our goal is to address an equally important
issue which is to develop defense mechanisms that scale to
large image domains, a task that is particularly challenging
for existing defenses both at design- and run-time as shown in
our experiments. Nevertheless, we include preliminary results
showing that VisionGuard is robust to a certain class of
white-box attacks by introducing randomness in the image
transformations.
C. Contribution
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as fol-
lows. First, we introduce VisionGuard, a new attack-agnostic
and dataset-agnostic detection technique for defense against
adversarial examples. Second, we show that VisionGuard is
more computationally efficient, both at run-time and design-
time, than defenses that rely on training sets or building
DNN-based detectors. This allows us to apply VisionGuard
to real-time applications that may also involve large-scale
image domains, illustrated by experiments on ImageNet. Third,
we provide extensive comparative experiments on MNIST,
CIFAR10, and ImageNet, that show that VisionGuard outper-
forms similar defenses in terms of scalability and detection
performance.
II. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Consider a classifier f : X → C, where X is the set of
images x ∈ Rn, where n is the number of pixels, and C
is the set of labels. Let L(x) and f(x) denote the true and
the predicted label of image x ∈ X , respectively. Then, the
goal of an attacker is to perturb an image x ∈ X by δ so
that the difference between the perturbed and the original
image is imperceptible and the perturbed image x∗ = x+ δ is
missclassified, i.e., f(x∗) 6= L(x). In what follows, we provide
a summary of existing adversarial attacks that can generate
such perturbations δ.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): The Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [3] creates adversarial examples x∗ by
perturbing the images x in the direction the gradient of the
loss function by magnitude , where  > 0 determines the
perturbation size, i.e.,
x∗ = x+ sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)), (1)
where sign(·) is the sign function and J(θ, x, y) is the
model’s loss function with parameters θ and labels y.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): The Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) method is a straightforward extension of
FGSM. Specifically, it applies adversarial noise many times
iteratively, giving rise to the following recursive formula:
x∗0 = x,
x∗i = clip,x[x
∗
i−1 + sign(∇xJ(θ,x∗i−1))], (2)
where x∗0 = x and clip,x(·) represent a clipping of the
values of a sample so that it is within the -neighborhood of
x. Compared to FGSM, this approach allows for extra control
over the attack.
Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA): An iterative
method for targeted misclassification is proposed in [20].
Specifically, an adversarial saliency map is constructed based
on the forward derivative, as this gives the adversary the
information required to make the neural network misclassify
a given sample. For an input x and a neural network f ,
the DNN output associated with the class j is denoted by
fj(x). To achieve a target class t, ft(x) must increase while
the probabilities fj(x), where j 6= t must decrease, until
t = argmaxc∈C fc(x). The adversary can accomplish this
by increasing input features using the following saliency map
S(x, t)
S(x, t)[i] =

0 if gt(x) < 0
0 if
∑
j 6=t gj(x) > 0
gt(x)|
∑
j 6=t gj(x)| otherwise,
where gj(x) = ∂fj(x)/∂xi and i is an input feature. High
values of S(x, t)[i] correspond to input features that will either
increase the target class, or decrease other classes significantly,
or both. Thus, the goal is to find input features i, j that
maximize S(x, t)[i] + S(x, t)[j] and perturb these features
by . This process is repeated iteratively until the target
misclassification is achieved.
Carlini-Wagner (CW): An iterative (targeted or untar-
geted) attack to generate adversarial examples with small
perturbations is proposed in [21]. The perturbation δ is selected
by solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
δ
||δ||p + g(x+ δ) (3)
subject to x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
where  > 0 is a suitably chosen constant and g(x+δ) depends
on the softmax output of the neural network and is selected
so that g(x+ δ) ≤ 0 if the perturbed image is misclassified or
gets a desired label, and g(x+ δ) > 0 otherwise.
III. EXISTING DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL INPUTS
To establish the reliability and security for DNN systems,
several techniques have been proposed that range from ad-
versarial and robust training to building separate classifiers
that detect adversarial inputs. A recent summary of existing
defenses can also be found in [22].
A common defense mechanism against adversarial examples
relies on augmenting the training set with adversarial examples
and incorporating an adversarial component as a regularizer in
the classification objective; see e.g., [23], [24] and the refer-
ences therein. However, these adversarial training methods are
effective only on adversarial examples that are crafted using
the parameters of the neural network, while adversarial inputs
are transferable between different models [3], [4].
Training methods that improve the robustness of neural net-
works, independently of the attack, have also been proposed.
For instance, distillation, initially proposed to reduce the size
of deep neural networks [11], can be used as a defensive
mechanism that makes crafting of adversarial examples dif-
ficult [25]. A computationally-efficient robust training method
is proposed in [4] that relies on Gaussian data augmentation
during training and requires the BReLU activation function.
Image purification methods have also been proposed that
rely on training neural network that act as ‘denoisers’ [26],
[12]. The goal of the denoisers is to purify the images, aiming
to remove any adversarial components, which are then fed
to the classifier. Another idea of defense is to use separate
DNNs to detect adversarial examples; see e.g., [27], [10], [28],
[29] and the references therein. Common limitations of these
approaches are that (i) they compromise the accuracy of the
network on clean images [8] since, purification is applied to
all images, whether they are adversarial or not and (ii) they
are often sensitive to attack-specific parameters or dependent
on the targeted classifier [30].
An alternative research direction for defenses against ad-
versarial attacks focuses on designing adversarial detectors
that do not depend on the training process of the targeted
classifier and do not rely on training new classifiers. Works
along this direction are presented in [13], [14], [31], [6], [7].
VisionGuard also lies in this category and complements exist-
ing robust/adversarial training approaches and purification-
based defenses.. In [13], [14] the kernel density estimation
(KDE) detector is proposed that selects thresholds on the
likelihood of an image. This likelihood is computed using the
outputs of the last hidden layer of the classifier for the image
under investigation and for all training images. [31] shows that
adversarial images have abnormal coefficients in the lower-
ranked principal components obtained by Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) that can potentially be exploited for de-
fense against adversarial inputs. Additionally, the purification-
based approaches proposed in [6], [7] apply transformations
(such as JPEG compression, bit depth reduction, and crop
ensemble) to the input images before feeding them to the
classifier aiming to remove any possible adversarial compo-
nents; however, these approaches affect the accuracy of the
classifier on clean images [8]. The majority of all defenses
discussed above have only been evaluated on smaller datasets
Algorithm 1: VisionGuard
Input: Input image x, Target classifier f : Rn → C;
Output: fd(x) = 1 if x is an adversarial input, and
fd(x) = 0 otherwise;
1 fd(x) = 0;
2 Feed x to the DNN model and get softmax output g(x);
3 Apply lossy compression with high compression quality
to x and get image x′;
4 Feed x′ to the DNN model and get softmax output g(x′);
5 Compute
J(x, x′) = min(DKL(g(x),g(x′)), DKL(g(x′),g(x)));
6 if J(x, x′) ≥ τ then
7 fd(x) = 1;
such as MNIST and CIFAR10; therefore, their applicability
on realistic, large-scale image domains is questionable as also
discussed in [18]. Recently, detectors that operate directly on
images, independent from the targeted classifier, have been
proposed that rely on steganalysis methods [32]. However, the
defense in [32] is attack-specific, since separate detectors must
be designed for each type of attack. Note that [32] is not
effective on small-scale images as they do not provide enough
samples to construct efficient features.
IV. VISIONGUARD: A NEW IMAGE DEFENSE FRAMEWORK
Our goal is to build a detector fd : X → {0, 1}, such
that (i) fd(x) = 0 if the image x is a legitimate image and
(ii) fd(x) = 1 if x ∈ X is an adversarial input, i.e., if it
has been manipulated/perturbed. In what follows, we propose
VisionGuard, an attack-agnostic compression-based detector;
see also Algorithm 1.
The proposed detector relies on the observation that clas-
sifiers are robust to certain small transformations applied
to the inputs that squeeze out features that may be un-
necessary for correct classification. In particular, here, as
a transformation, we employ lossy compression with high
compression quality (e.g., JPEG compression). VisionGuard
comprises four steps to detect whether an input image x
is adversarial or not. First, the input image x is fed to
the classifier f to get the softmax output denoted by g(x).
Second, lossy compression with high compression quality is
applied to x to get an image denoted by x′. Third, x′ is
fed to the classifier to get the softmax output denoted by
g(x′). Fourth, x is classified as adversarial if the softmax
outputs g(x) and g(x′) are significantly different. Formally,
we measure similarity between g(x) and g(x′) using the K-L
divergence measure, denoted by DKL(g(x),g(x′). Specifically,
if J(x, x′) = min(DKL(g(x),g(x′)), DKL(g(x′),g(x))) is
greater than a threshold τ , then x is considered an adversarial
input, i.e., fd(x) = 1; otherwise, x is classified as a legitimate
image, i.e., fd(x) = 0.
Detection Thresholds: To determine the detection threshold
τ we use Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) graphs that
are constructed as follows. First, given a set X of clean images
we construct the corresponding set of adversarial images,
denoted by Xa, using any attack or possibly a mixture of
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Fig. 2. Accuracy of the target DNN classifier on test sets of adversarial
images generated by FGSM, PGD, JSMA, and CW for various attack-specific
parameters on the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets.
attacks. Next, recall that our detection mechanism fd maps
each image to 0 (legitimate input) or 1 (adversarial input).
Hereafter, we call the class of adversarial images as ‘positives’
and the class of clean images as ‘negatives’. Then, given a
threshold τ , we estimate the true positive rate as the number of
true positives (i.e., the number of adversarial inputs classified
as adversarial inputs) divided by the total number of positives,
i.e., the total number of adversarial images. Similarly, we
estimate the false positive rate as the number of false positives
(i.e., the number of legitimate inputs classified as adversarial
inputs) divided by the total number of negatives, i.e., the total
number of clean images. Then, ROC graphs can be constructed
by plotting the TP rate on the Y axis and the FP rate on the X
axis for various thresholds τ . Given an ROC graph, we select
the threshold that returns the closest point to (0, 1), since this
point corresponds to perfect attack detection.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We tested VisionGuard (VG) against the state-of-the-art
attacks, FGSM, PGD, JSMA, and CW, on three standard
machine learning datasets: MNIST, CIFAR 10, and ImageNet.
MNIST contains 70, 000 grayscale 28 × 28 images divided
into 60, 000 training samples and 10, 000 test samples with
TABLE I
RUNTIME (SECS) OF ATTACK ALGORITHMS PER IMAGE
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
FGSM 0.00005 0.0017 0.1728
PGD 0.005 1.11 8.46
JSMA 1.75 19.67 DNF
CW 0.005 1.01 16.39
TABLE II
MNIST: COMPARATIVE EXPERIMENTS IN TERMS OF AUC AGAINST
MAGNET AND KDE.
MNIST VG+JPEG92 MagNet KDE
FGSM  = 0.01 61.6% 58.4% 56.2%
FGSM  = 0.05 75.9% 71.8% 76.5%
FGSM  = 0.1 71.3% 72.9% 84.5%
FGSM  = 0.2 57.1% 51.6% 92.0%
PGD  = 0.01 93.7% 87.5% 83.7%
PGD  = 0.02 90.0% 85.9% 81.7%
PGD  = 0.04 79.8% 76.7% 85.5%
JSMA  = 0.05 71.7% 71.3% 65.7%
JSMA  = 0.1 83.4% 80.2% 77.8%
JSMA  = 0.2 91.7% 85.5% 85.8%
CW  = −2 96.3% 95.7% 88.1%
CW  = 0.01 96.1% 96.0% 89.9%
CW  = 2 94.7% 96.0% 87.3%
10 classes. CIFAR10 contains 60, 000 RGB 32 × 32 images
divided into 50, 000 training samples and 10, 000 test samples
with 10 classes, as well. ImageNet (ILSVRC2012) contains
1.4 million RGB 224 × 224 images divided in 1.2 million
training images, 50, 000 validation images, and 150, 000 test-
ing images. For the purposes of experimentation, we treat
the validation set as the training set due to the availability
of labels. For the MNIST classification task, we consider a
simple, fully-connected neural network with two hidden layers
and 64 neurons per layer that achieves 97.2% accuracy on
the test set. As for the CIFAR10 and ImageNet datasets, we
consider convolutional neural networks with residual blocks
(ResNet-56 and ResNet-50, respectively) [33]. The accuracy
of the trained ResNet-56 and ResNet-50 is 93.7% and 73.4%,
respectively.
Evaluation of Attacks: We apply the FGSM, PGD, JSMA,
and CW attacks, for various attack-specific parameters on the
MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet test sets. The accuracy of
the classifier on the resulting adversarial test sets is depicted
in Figure 2. Observe in this figure that as the magnitude of
the perturbation increases, the accuracy of the neural network
decreases. Moreover, observe that as the image dimensions in-
crease, it is easier to fool the target classifier. The reason is that
adversaries can search for adversarial inputs over larger input
feature spaces. In Table I, we also report the average runtime
required to generate a single adversarial image on MNIST, CI-
FAR10, and ImageNet using the FGSM, PGD, JSMA, and CW
attacks. Observe that the most computationally-light attack is
FGSM while the most computationally-expensive is JSMA.
In fact, JSMA failed to generate an adversarial ImageNet
image due to memory constraints within the attack method.
Also, note that there is a trade-off between computationally-
efficiency and effectiveness of the attack. Specifically, observe
in Figure 2 that e.g., on CIFAR10, FGSM and JSMA are the
most and least effective attacks, respectively.
TABLE III
CIFAR10: COMPARATIVE EXPERIMENTS IN TERMS OF AUC AGAINST
MAGNET AND KDE
.
CIFAR10 VG+JPEG92 MagNet KDE
FGSM  = 0.01 84.1% 84.3% 80.8%
FGSM  = 0.05 82.9% 89.8% 89.2%
FGSM  = 0.1 78.3% 89.7% 90.4%
FGSM  = 0.2 76.9% 85.5% 89.7%
PGD  = 0.01 93.7% 93.9% 96.9%
PGD  = 0.02 91.1% 93.7% 96.4%
PGD  = 0.04 89.2% 93.4% 95.9%
JSMA  = 0.05 93.9% 93.4% 95.0%
JSMA  = 0.1 94.2% 93.7% 95.5%
JSMA  = 0.2 94.2% 93.7% 95.6%
CW  = −2 87.2% 90.0% 89.6%
CW  = 0.01 85.8% 89.5% 89.0%
CW  = 2 84.8% 88.9% 87.1%
Evaluation of VisionGuard & Comparative Experi-
ments: In what follows, we evaluate the efficacy of VG using
ROC graphs. For the construction of ROC graphs, we call
‘positives’ the images (i) that have been attacked (even if
the attack fails, i.e., it does not cause misclassification) and
(ii) the clean images that are misclassified as they can also
been seen as ‘adversarial’ inputs. All other images (i.e., clean
images that are correctly classified) are called ’negatives’.
We examine the performance of VG when it is integrated
with JPEG compression with various compression qualities
and with median filters. Note that VG along with rotation
transformations, such as the ones used in [9], or bit-depth
reduction transformations, as used in [6], [7], yield poor
detection performance and, therefore, such results are omitted.
Finally, we provide comparisons against MagNet [10] and the
KDE detector that is originally proposed in [13] and later
presented also in [14]. To compare against MagNet and KDE,
we leverage the code provided by the authors.
MNIST: Table II presents the area under the ROC graphs
(AUC) when VG is applied using JPEG compression with
92% compression quality. Similar performance was seen for
compression qualities 75%, 92%, 98%, and median 3×3 filter.
The additional results are omitted due to space limitations.
Observe in Table II that VG outperforms both MagNet and
KDE in almost all attacks. Also, note that VG and MagNet
fail to detect FGSM-generated adversarial inputs. Finally, VG
using JPEG compression requires 0.0016 secs on average to
check if an input image is adversarial.
CIFAR10: The respective AUC comparison for CIFAR10 is
presented in Table III. VG, MagNet, and KDE have compara-
ble AUC-based performance on adversarial images generated
using the PGD, JSMA and CW attacks, while both KDE and
MagNet outperform VG on FGSM-based adversarial inputs,
especially for large values of the attack parameter . Note that
[18] states that the KDE detector gives poor performance on
CIFAR10, which contradicts our results. Finally, VG using
JPEG compression requires 0.0187 secs on average to check
if an input image is adversarial.
ImageNet: To evaluate VG on ImageNet, we have randomly
sampled 2, 000 images; the results are summarized in Table
IV. Observe that VG attains high AUC-based performance
(> 90%) for almost all attacks and any attack parameters.
TABLE IV
IMAGENET: COMPARATIVE EXPERIMENTS IN TERMS OF AUC AGAINST MAGNET AND KDE
.
ImageNet VG+JPEG75 VG+JPEG92 VG+JPEG98 VG+Median3 MagNet KDE
FGSM  = 0.01 84.0% 89.7% 86.6% 85.0%
DNF
(could not train
auto-encoders)
47.1%
FGSM  = 0.05 85.3% 94.7% 86.7% 88.9% 47.9%
FGSM  = 0.1 88.9% 98.7% 88.8% 93.3% 46.0%
FGSM  = 0.2 91.0% 99.8% 82.2% 94.0% 47.4%
PGD  = 0.01 89.6% 94.5% 87.4% 86.7% 43.2%
PGD  = 0.02 89.8% 98.7% 93.4% 87.8% 46.8%
PGD  = 0.04 94.3% 98.4% 91.2% 80.1% 47.6%
CW  = −2 93.2% 97.9% 82.6% 82.4% 54.9%
CW  = 0 87.2% 91.9% 88.3% 88.6% 47.4%
CW  = 2 80.9% 85.6% 85.0% 87.9% 47.2%
TABLE V
DISK-SPACE REQUIREMENTS OF VISIONGUARD, MAGNET, AND KDE PER
DATASET
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
VG 0 0 0
MagNet 24KB 16KB DNF (> 2 weeks)
KDE 5.1MB 4.2MB ≈ 4.8GB
MagNet requires a new auto-encoder for each new dataset it
is applied to. An auto-encoder for ImageNet is not provided by
the authors in [10] while training such an auto-encoder did not
finish within two weeks; therefore, comparisons on ImageNet
are not available. Furthermore, extracting the embeddings for
1.2 million ImageNet images, as required in [13], [14], [15],
required 36 hours approximately. In Table IV we report the
performance of the KDE detector which is comparable to the
performance of a random detector. Finally, note that VG using
JPEG compression requires on average 0.08 secs to check if an
ImageNet image is adversarial. As the dimensions of the input
images increase, the runtime of VG increases slightly as well.
This is expected as the JPEG compression/decompression time
complexity is O(n), where n is the number of pixels [34].
Dataset-agnosticity: Recall that MagNet requires a new
autoencoder for each new dataset it is applied to. Similarly,
the KDE-based detectors [13], [14], [15] rely on extracting
embeddings from training sets. As a result, it is questionable if
these detectors achieve high detection performance when they
are deployed in real-world environments for which datasets
may not exist. Notice in Tables II-IV that VisionGuard is
dataset-agnostic as the same transformation, JPEG with com-
pression quality 92% yields high detection performance across
the MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet datasets that differ both
in content and image dimensions.
Disk-space Requirements: In Table V, we report the disk-
space requirements for VG, MagNet, and KDE. MagNet
requires storing the auto-encoders that are used at runtime.
The auto-encoders used in [10] are stored as keras models
and require 24 KB and 16 KB for MNIST and CIFAR10,
respectively. KDE requires disk-space to store the last hidden
layer output of the DNN for all training images. In particular,
KDE requires 5.1 MB, 4.2 MB, and 4.8 GB for MNIST,
CIFAR10, and ImageNet images respectively. In contrast, VG
does not have any disk-space requirements, as it does not rely
on training sets or building new DNNs and performs the image
transformations in memory.
Robustness to Random Noise: As JPEG compression is
sensitive to noise, we also evaluated the robustness of VG on
random noise. Specifically, first we add random Gaussian noise
to the original clean images. The accuracy of the classifiers on
the generated noisy MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet datasets
dropped by 1% on average across all datasets indicating
that the generated noise caused misclassifications. Then, we
compute the ROC curves where positives are the original clean
and correctly classified images and negatives are the resulting
noisy and correctly classified images. The AUC is 53.65%,
55.35%, and 44.62% on MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet,
respectively. This shows that VG cannot distinguish between
clean and noisy images and, therefore, it will not raise false
alarms due to random noise e.g., dust in the camera lens.
Robustness to White-box Attacks: The majority of exist-
ing defenses, including [10], [13], [14], can be easily bypassed,
as shown recently, especially in white-box settings, where the
attacker knows the structure of the detector. In particular,
MagNet [10] is sensitive to adversarial inputs as it relies
on training auto-encoders. Similarly, KDE [13], [14] can be
bypassed in a two-step attack derived from the CW attack [18].
First, the CW attack is applied to an input image x yielding
an image x′. Second, a modified version of the CW attack
is applied to x′ which yields an image x′′. This secondary
attack extends the CW attack by incorporating the KDE of
the adversarial image x′ generated in the first step in the
objective function (3). In particular, the objective function of
the secondary attack is ||δ||p + c(g(x′ + δ) +m(x′′)), where
m(x′′) = max(− log(KDE(x′′)) − , 0). In a similar way, by
incorporating the KL-based metric J(x′, x′′) into the objective
function of (3), VisionGuard may be bypassed. However, even
in this case, we can introduce randomness in terms of the
compression quality or the employed transformation to make
it harder to fool the detector. Particularly, recall that the perfor-
mance of VisionGuard does not change significantly on CW-
based adversarial images as the image transformations change;
see Table IV. However, J(x, x′) changes significantly across
different transformations. For instance, using the CW attack
with  = 2 on ImageNet, the mean and variance of J(x′, x′′)
across 2000 images is (i) mean = 0.4569 and var = 0.3795
for JPEG75; (ii) mean = 0.1277 and var = 0.0525 for
JPEG92; (iii) mean = 0.0740 and var = 0.0381 for JPEG98;
and (iv) mean = 0.9854 and var = 1.0971 for Median
3 × 3. By applying random transformations once an input
image is received (i.e., in this case the attacker cannot know the
parameters of the transformation), we allow J(x′, x′′) (which
is also part of the CW white-box attack) to take values that
may be completely different from what the attacker thinks.
For instance, when implementing this CW white-box attack
we observed that if the value of J(x′, x′′) used by the attacker
is significantly different from the true one, the AUC decreases
only by 2−5% depending on the value of the attack parameter
c within the the secondary CW attack. A similar observation is
also made in [9]. Nevertheless, this white-box attack distorts
significantly the input images, since the CW attack is applied
twice to the input image. Note that introducing randomness to
the KDE detector is impossible by its construction.
Moreover, we would like to emphasize that existing attack
algorithms are quite computationally expensive and, therefore,
they can be hardly applied to real-time applications such as
autonomous driving. For instance, recall from Table I that
the CW attack requires in average more than 16 seconds to
craft a single adversarial input while this runtime significantly
increases in the white-box setting. As a result, to bypass a
detector in a white-box setting, the attacker not only does it
need to know the structure of the detector but it also needs a
sufficient amount of time to perform the attack.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed VisionGuard an attack- and
dataset-agnostic defense against adversarial input to perception
systems that scales to large-scale image domains. To determine
whether an image is adversarial or not, VisionGuard checks
if the output of the classifier remains consistent under JPEG
transformations. Future work will focus on designing defenses
against physical adversarial attacks.
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